ONTOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS FOR LITERARY THEORY
which resides elsewhere than its author had supposed: it is the by-product of Ingarden′s larger ontological investigations which promise to yield their true value for presentday thinkers.
Indeed the book contains a huge mass of individual ontological insights systematically developed and applied to specific areas (for example, causality, theory of language, philosophy of mind, clarification of specific ontological issues in the tradition of philosophy . . .)--always for the sake of Ingarden′s larger goal, that of justifying in a critical manner his realist opposition to those, such as Husserl, who argued in favour of some form of idealist conception of the world and of the foundations of consciousness. Ingarden characterised the idealist position as one according to which the real world was conceived too closely after the fashion of fictional worlds projected by works of literature; hence the onto1ogical character of his investigations of the literary work of art, which Ingarden hoped would reveal the untenability of any narrowing of the gap between real objects and products of consciousness.
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kind of thing it is to which aesthetic value can properly be ascribed.
At first it might be supposed that there is a simple answer to this question: that it is the ″work of art″ which has aesthetic value. But as yet this tells us nothing of the intrinsic nature, the ontological structure of the ″work of art″. As can be seen by reflection upon the case of, say, the dramatic work, this structure may be tremendously complex, for in our determination of its constituents we must find a way of taking account of all those features which may contribute to the status of the work as an aesthetically formed whole, take account, that is, of all that may be phenomenologically given in the various different kinds of appreciation of the work, not only by the spectator in relation to the concrete visual and aural material of a given performance and by the actors performing the work in relation to this visual and aural material and to the script, but also by subjects outside any context of performance who accede to the work as an abstract whole, either in a temporally extended way (in some kind of mental ′perfor-mance′, or ′reading′ of the script), or in such a way that the work is treated as an unextended unity, for example within contexts where it is merely referred to in passing.
Yet however complex nay be the structure of works of art of each of the various different species, it is crucial to the whole of aesthetics that the appropriate ontological analyses of this structure be carried through. For only when we know what kind of thing the work of art is can we determine the various axes along which it may acquire aesthetic value, be compared with other works, etc. Only then, that is to say, would we be in a position to tackle the central
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Value-theoretical problems of aesthetics itself.
The Ontology of Fiction
In the present essay I want to sketch one plank of such an ontological foundation for literary theory, using the problems which arise as a means of introducing the Ingardenian mode of argument to the practising literary theorist. A literary work conceived as an organised whole has various constituents, e.g. the characters of the work, the individual word-meanings, sentence-rhythms, plotsegments, historical allusions, and so on. Clearly there is no question that these ′constituents′ be conceived after the pattern of matches in a box (side by side with each other). They exhibit, rather, a whole series of interrelations and mutual dependencies. It is Ingarden′s service to have unravelled this texture of interrelationships, to have shown that in order to make clear the structure of the literary work it is necessary to conceive it as a ″stratified″ whole, constituents of one particular stratum acting together to ″found″ constituents of ″higher″ strata when the text of the work is ″concretised″ in our acts of reading. which we can achieve a faithful reading of a fictional work without presupposing from the start that it is correlated with its own specific field of fictional characters. We can gain some idea of the nature of this ″field of characters″ if we spend some time reflecting upon the notion of ″access″ --a notion which has always stood at the very centre of phenomenological ontology.
Ontological and Epistemological Incompleteness
We have access to those flesh-and-blood human beings who are our contemporaries through physical contact of various kinds (shaking hands, etc. Note however that this problem of ontological incompleteness is something which raises its head exclusively on the theoretical level: we are never aware of the intrinsic incompleteness of fictional characters in our actual readings of works. This is because the possibility of a complete perception or complete knowledge is excluded also in the case of real objects, owing to the ever-present epistemological incompleteness involved in our access to such objects. Thus we can do no other, in our pre-theoretical commune with real objects and with the quasi-real objects of fiction, than ascribe all inadequacies in our knowledge to the side of (4) (Shakespeare′s) Hamlet is a fictional character.
And of the second kind (B): (5) Sherlock Holmes was a detective who lived in Baker
Street, played the violin . . . .
(6) Dr. Watson is a more likeable character than, has a warmer personality than Holmes.
(7) The Blagdon rapist imitated Raskolnikov. 
Ontological and Epistemological Nodality: the Nature of the Objects of Fiction
We might summarise our results thus far concerning the ontological structure of fictional characters by saying that such characters are individual objects possessing two ranks of properties, members of the first rank being all, as inspection reveals, ″non-material properties″ (being either formal or ″purely intentional″), members of the second rank consisting of those properties which seem to be assigned to the given characters by the sentences of the appropriate works. 9 In the final section of this paper I shall attempt to clarify this peculiar structure and at the same time to
show how the problems which it reveals are relevant to the practical concerns of the literary theorist, by going beyond the Ingardenian ontological mode of investigation and calling into aid certain considerations relating to the ″act phenomenology″ of our reading of literary works.
__________ 9
Here we include also all those properties which are, within certain limits, deducible from the properties assigned by the given sentences.
Cf. the discussion in J. Wood, The Logic of Fiction (Paris and the Hague 1974), § 13.
1O
The group of analyses which pertain to act phenomenology of the kind which is illustrated in the text are drawn not only from Ingarden′s LANGUAGE, LITERATURE AND MEANING Let us recall, first of all, the notions of epistemological and ontological incompleteness introduced in 3 above.
For the sake of the present argument we may risk talking in terms of two ″spheres″, an epistemological and an ontological sphere, and it will be clear, I hope, that the degrees of completeness on either side of the boundary between the two spheres may vary, more or less independently of each other.
Thus we can encounter, on the one hand, cases of epistemologically incomplete access to ontologically complete objects--this is true, indeed, of every perception of a real object. And we can encounter also, on the other hand, cases of access to objects where the degree of epistemological completeness is greater than is warranted by indeterminacy intrinsic to the object in question. This arises, e.g., when in reading a work of fiction we import from our own experience aspects which are additional to those held in readiness within the work itself. (As when I identify myself with the hero of a work of detective fiction, and ascribe to him qualities which I possess). Further the axes of epistemological and ontological completeness may lie wholly skew to each other. This occurs when the ″matter″ with which I epistemologically ″complete″ an object is alien to the material-ontological constitution of that object itself (when I mistake a sand-dune for an oasis, or a Van
Meegeren for a Vermeer).
What is important is that it is not only in regard to the notion of relative completeness -incompleteness that we encounter this kind of two-sided independence of variation __________ works but also from those of his mentor, Edmund Husserl, in particular from the latter′s Ideas (originally published, 1913).
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(i.e. among acts and their objects). An act may be temporally extended even though its object be temporally punctual (as when I reflect for some time on a particular instantaneous event). And it is possible also to relate to temporally extended objects in temporally instantaneous acts, (e.g. Yet in our readings of works we ″fill out″ the objects depicted by conceiving them as involved precisely in actions and events of this sort. Indeed because our only accessroute to such objects lies through the understanding of a determinately structured set of sentences involving action and event-verbs of determinate types, it follows that we cannot accede to fictional objects in a fulfilled way at all except as bound up with corresponding actions and events.
Yet this epistemological filling out on the level of plot is again something which is ″neutralised″, ″suppressed″--at least in adequate readings of a work: aesthetically adequate readings involve a certain detachment of our own personal interest from the fate of the characters depicted.
In fact similar epistemological fillings out--each determinately neutralised or suppressed--pertain to every level of the work. In each case we have to deal with objects which are in themselves in a certain sense ′nodai′, i.e.
purely non-extended: they serve as mere co-ordinate points of our attention in our acts of reading works of fiction.
Yet they are at the same time objects which bring-forth in determinate ways epistemological fillings out, in consequence of the fact that it is only be making an adequate concretisation of relevant sequences of sentences that we can gain LANGUAGE, LITERATURE AND MEANING access to those objects at all. Just as the access-route to perceptual objects, through an array of perceptual experiences of certain kinds, determines the nature of our epistemological model of such objects, so the access-route to fictional objects through an array of sentences of particular types determinates the nature of the model which we bring to bear in our re-creation of such objects in particular readings.
It is the task of the literary theorist to clarify the consequences of this dependence of fictional objects upon determinate types of readings of particular sequences of sentences. In particular he must find a way of determining the axes along which epistemological fillings out of the various different kinds may take place in such a way as to remain faithful to the work and then, eventually, to yield a reading which is adequate to bring to light the aesthetic qualities of the work on each of its various different levels. I hope that I have shown that both ontological arid phenomenological analyses--of the type so well demonstrated by Ingarden--may be of help to the literary theorist in his execution of these tasks.
